Introduction
The purpose of this study is to determine how net asset values (NAVs) that general partners (GPs) of private equity funds provide to their funds' limited partners (LPs) compare to the subsequent net cash flows the LPs will receive. To do this, we compare NAVs at each valuation date to the corresponding future discounted cash flows (DCFs) using cross-sectional regressions. In doing so, we take the DCFs as the true economic measure of fund value at each valuation date. If GPs are unbiased in their valuations, then the NAVs and DCFs should essentially be the same.
NAVs are generally regarded as estimates of fair value. LPs use these valuations to assess interim fund performance and to make investment allocation decisions. As a result, the question of whether NAVs are unbiased assessments of fair value has been a central focus of academic and professional research examining private equity fund performance. Studies have generally focused on how private equity funds perform relative to some benchmark such as the S&P 500 or relative to each other (see Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan, 2014; among others) . Others examine how short term changes in NAVs relate to corresponding cash flows (Jenkinson, Sousa, and Stucke, 2013) . However, ours is the first study to examine whether NAVs are unbiased predictors of future discounted cash flows. In addition, our research approach permits us to examine if there are identifiable trends or biases in the valuations during the fund life, particularly in response to incentives GPs face over the life of the funds that they manage.
To address our research question, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of DCFs, which we take as an estimate of true economic value on NAVs at each valuation date (typically quarterly over the life of the fund). Our sample, which comprises NAV and cash flow information taken from the Burgiss private equity fund database, relates to 483 funds with available information beginning in 1988 and ending in 2011. We estimate separate regressions for the 327 venture capital funds and 156 buyout funds, to permit coefficient differences potentially arising from relative discretion accorded to GPs of venture capital funds that are more difficult to value. To assess whether there are any patterns in valuations throughout the average fund's life, we estimate separate fund-year regressions in which we partition sample observations by fund-year. To assess whether there are any intertemporal patterns in valuations, we estimate separate yearly regressions in which we partition observations by calendar year, along with estimating fund-year regressions separately over the first and second halves of our sample period. The fund-year regressions permit us to assess whether there are identifiable trends or biases in the valuations during the fund life. In particular, because GPs typically begin to fundraise for new funds approximately midway through the typical ten-year life of the fund they manage, they face incentives to overstate NAVs. Similarly, GPs of relatively unsuccessful funds may face incentives to overstate
NAVs to obtain higher management fees. The calendar year regressions permit us to assess if
GPs valuations tend to improve over calendar time because of learning or changes in valuation techniques.
Findings from our primary tests indicate that the NAVs GPs provide to LPs of both venture capital and buyout funds are extremely good predictors of future economic performance, i.e., NAVs are relatively unbiased indicators of true economic value of the funds they manage. Findings from the fund-year regressions generally indicate that NAVs are somewhat conservative estimates of value early in a fund's life, which we show is likely attributable to GPs simply setting NAVs to contributions in the first few years. However, NAVs generally converge to true economic value by year three. Findings from the calendar year regressions indicate that NAVs generally are more conservative in the first half of our sample period, but a somewhat different picture in the latter half of the sample. Most notably, NAVs for venture capital funds tend to overstate economic value after 1999, which suggests that venture capital fund GPs did not incorporate in a timely manner the drop in expected future cash flows associated with the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000, and failed in future years to make adjustments to correct for NAV overstatement. We also conduct crosssectional tests that focus on whether there is evidence of managerial manipulation of NAVs in response to incentives to overstate NAVs during fundraising and in the later years of a fund.
The findings indicate that GPs of relatively poor performing venture capital funds (buyout funds) appear to overstate NAVs during fundraising periods (in the latter years).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the institutional background and related literature. Section 3 presents our predictions and research design, section 4 describes our sample and data, and section 5 presents our results. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Institutional Background and Related Literature

Private Equity Funds
Private equity comprises equity investments that are not publicly traded or listed on an exchange. Usually private equity managers focus on either more entrepreneurial companiesVenture Capital (VC) -or later-stage growth companies and/or buyouts of relatively mature companies. We refer to funds that invest in VCs as VC funds, and those that invest in more mature companies as Buyout funds. Most private equity is raised using limited partnership fund structures, where a private equity manager (the General Partner, or GP, of the partnership) raises money from institutional investors (the Limited Partners, or LPs). These limited partnership funds are closed-end with a finite life, and are usually incorporated in favorable tax and legal jurisdictions. The GP receives a management fee and, if the fund's internal rate of return during its life exceeds a threshold rate, additional compensation in the form of "carried interest." We explain the economics of private equity funds in more detail below in relation to the valuation of the fund's assets.
Private equity funds typically have a specified contractual life of ten years, during which time they invest in, work with, and then sell their stakes in portfolio companies. The fund life can be, and often is, extended by agreement should the fund have remaining investments that have not yet been sold by the end of the 10-year period. The terms of the partnership are governed by the Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA), which will specify the investment mandate, the governance of the partnership, and the obligations and rewards for the LPs and the GPs. The LPs commit capital to the fund, which is drawn down as and when the GP identifies investment opportunities. The initial years -typically the first 5-6 yearscomprise the fund's investment period, during which time the GPs can draw down the committed capital. Towards the end of the investment period GPs are typically permitted to raise a follow-on fund, to ensure they are always able to make investments should opportunities arise. When the fund's investment period is over, the GP can no longer seek additional capital and the GP has the remaining fund life to realize investment returns. As soon as investments are realized the funds are distributed to the LPs.
The GP's compensation has two components. The first is an annual management fee for running the fund. Although the details vary by fund, the typical LPA specifies different arrangements for the management fee in the investment period and the post-investment period. During the former, a management fee of around 1.5 -2% is charged. Importantly, the fee basis is committed capital, rather than invested capital. During the post-investment period, the GP receives either a smaller percentage of committed capital (for instance, 1%, or the fee might "step-down" by 20% per annum over the remaining life of the fund) or the GP is allowed to charge a fixed percentage of invested capital. Typically, the invested capital is defined in the LPA as the lower of (i) the original cost of the remaining investments and (ii) the reported net asset value (NAV) of the fund. A reason for the "lower of" clause is that if NAV is used, then the GP can, in principle, manipulate his/her compensation by manipulating the reported NAV, but no such manipulation is possible if original cost is used so long as NAV exceeds original cost. However, manipulation is still possible if NAV is less than original cost and the GP fails to report NAV correctly. Regardless, it is clear that the fixed compensation is structured so that the GP receives the largest proportion during the investment period, during which he/she is actively identifying assets to be purchased by the fund.
The second part of the GP's compensation is a profit share, or "carried interest,"
which is typically 20% of the private equity fund's profit, i.e., excess of cash realized by the fund in excess of committed capital. However, the GP does not receive carried interest unless the fund's internal rate of return (IRR) to investors exceeds a pre-determined hurdle rate established in the partnership agreement. The vast majority of private equity funds stipulate an 8% hurdle rate, although some GPs with excellent reputations manage to avoid having to achieve a hurdle rate. It is important to note that, although some interim payments of carried interest may be made during the life of the partnership, the final distribution of profits will be made on the basis of the cash received by the investors at the end of the fund's life, rather than reported NAVs. This is unlike hedge funds where profits are often shared on an annual basis using the reported NAVs each year, subject to a "high water mark" so that if valuations fall future profits are not paid unless the fund exceeds its prior highest valuation.
Reporting and performance measurement
LPs receive semi-annual or quarterly financial statements from the GP, which include the NAV of the fund, along with an income statement and a cash flow statement. Although the statements need not be prepared in accordance with US GAAP or IFRS (depending on the jurisdiction), they typically conform to a set of industry standards. 1 The interim financial statements are not typically audited, but the annual statements are audited. In contrast to managers of publicly traded firms, private equity fund managers have considerably more discretion when measuring NAVs. Regressing quarterly changes in NAVs on quarterly changes in cash flows for funds managed by CALPERS, Jenkinson, Sousa and Stucke (2013) provides evidence that private equity fund GPs appear to understate NAVs over the life of the fund, particularly during the early years of a fund, perhaps to smooth returns and avoid having to report asset write-downs.
However, there are also incentives to inflate NAVs. First, as noted above, GPs typically raise follow-on funds during years 3 through 6 of the life of an existing fund.
Potential investors will want to know the performance of the current fund, and this will depend to a considerable extent on the reported NAVs. Fund performance tends to be measured using two metrics: the internal rate of return (IRR) and the multiple of invested capital (MOIC) . During the life of the fund both of these will depend upon the reported NAVs. In the case of the IRR, the NAV at the calculation date is treated as a final "distribution," in addition to the cash contributions and distributions that have occurred up to that point. In the case of the MOIC, it is customary to measure this by summing the cash distributed and the remaining NAV, and comparing this to the cash contributed up to the date of measurement. For many funds, cash returns for few investments in a fund's portfolio have been realized at the time the fundraising occurs, and so these interim performance measures rely heavily upon the reported NAVs. This can create incentives to inflate NAVs to impress potential investors.
Second, as noted in the previous section, in the post-investment period management fees are charged on the basis of the lower of the historic cost of the remaining investments and the NAV. This creates an incentive for the GP to avoid writing down poorly performing assets. This temptation to "milk the management fees" applies later in the life of the fund, and only for the funds that are performing poorly. We test in our empirical work whether there is any evidence of GPs reporting higher NAVs either in the fundraising period or towards the end of the life of the fund.
Valuation and asset allocation decisions
While the commitment of capital that investors make to GPs extends over several years, investors need to know the amount actually invested each year. A typical pension fund, endowment or other institutional investor will perform a portfolio optimization based on their appetite for risk, expected asset returns, and liquidity needs. This will result in a strategic asset allocation for each asset class. If, for example, the allocation to private equity is 10%, then the chief investment officer will have to work out the extent, and distribution over time, of fund commitments that will achieve this target. This is not straightforward as capital is only invested as the GPs find profitable opportunities, and the extent and timing of investments' liquidation are unknown and difficult to predict. Having decided on the optimal commitment schedule, the investor will then monitor the extent of the capital invested over time, with a view to keeping close to the target allocation. prices that should discount the expected future cash flows accruing to that asset using the (unobserved) cost of capital. No such market prices exist for private equity funds. Therefore, our analysis will compare, at each point in time, the current NAV produced by the fund (and/or its auditors) and the unknown future cash flows. Such a comparison clearly only becomes meaningful once a reasonable proportion of the committed capital has been invested, and so we will focus on results after the first year of the fund, but we report results for all NAV dates including the initial one for each fund. A key question relates to the discount rate to use for this NPV calculation. From an ex ante perspective, it seems reasonable for investors to use a discount rate that is consistent with average realized returns, and this is the approach we adopt drawing on the findings of Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2014) .
Investors are clearly also interested in the extent to which NAVs represent fair value when making investment decisions. If NAVs are systematically biased estimators of fair value, then the interim performance numbers produced by GPs at the time of fundraising by GPs will be unreliable. Clearly, the performance of the current fund should be only one consideration when making investment decisions into future funds, as the evidence of performance persistence in private equity is weak, but it remains nonetheless an important factor for most investors.
Related Literature
The literature concerning private equity is experiencing rapid growth with the availability of several new data sources providing direct access to private equity valuations on a quarterly basis. Previously, researchers assessing the performance of private equity were limited to using information at irregular discrete event dates such as those relating to initial public offerings of firms in private equity investment portfolios or those relating to acquisitions. These investments exhibit an inherent self-selection bias in that they tend to be successful ventures and thus returns to private equity based on these events are biased upwards (Cochrane 2005) .
With the availability of private equity data, self-selection is less of an issue since valuations are observable even for funds not performing very well. 2 A number of studies using these databases have investigated issues surrounding private equity investments including whether private equity funds provide competitive returns (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009 ; among others), variation in performance including persistence in successive funds as well as networking related differences (Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; Barber and Yasuda, 2014) , and GP compensation related issues (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) .
When assessing performance most studies adjust reported returns calculated from the combination of cash flows that have occurred and NAVs, which as explained above are treated as terminal period cash flows, using a benchmark such as the S&P 500 (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) , or some other risk adjusted return based on average industry unlevered betas (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009 ).
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) In contrast to these studies that focus on whether private equity investments provide reasonable levels of returns to investors relative to other investment opportunities, our research objective is to determine how NAVs that GPs provide to their funds' investors compare to the subsequent net cash flows they will receive. In doing so, we also assess whether (a) there are identifiable trends or biases in the valuations during the fund life, (b)
GPs valuations tend to improve over calendar time because of learning or changes in valuation techniques, and (c) there are discernable differences in valuations for funds that invest in existing companies-buyout funds-or those that invest in new startups-venture capital funds.
Other studies focus on whether there are specific incentives faced by GPs that may cause them to manipulate NAVs. Jenkinson, Sousa, and Stucke (2013) extracts quarterly NAV and cash flow information for private equity funds investments of the California Public Employees Retirement System, the largest pension funds in the US. The study regresses quarter-by-quarter changes in NAVs on cash flows and series of controls. This study finds that for every dollar returned to investors the NAV falls by approximately 65 cents. The authors interpret this finding as arising from a generally conservative NAV valuation, particularly in the early years of a fund, as evidenced by higher changes in NAV during the fund raising period. The authors conjecture that perhaps GPs behave conservatively early in a fund's life in an effort to make it easier to report improved performance during periods in which the GPs are trying to raise money for a new follow on fund.
Brown, Gredil, and , which also accesses the Burgiss private equity database, considers whether GPs boost reported returns by inflating NAVs during fundraising periods. The study finds some evidence of such manipulation by examining whether there is a relation between a fund's IRR during the fundraising period and its actual realized IRR.
However, the study also finds that managers who succumb to this temptation are less likely to raise a subsequent fund, which suggests that investors see through such manipulation.
Finally, Barber and Yasuda (2014) , which accesses the Preqin private equity database,
shows that fundraising success -in terms of the ability to raise a subsequent fund, and the size of any such fund -is related to reported performance -measured by IRRs -relative to funds of the same vintage. The study also finds that GPs time their fundraising efforts when such relative performance is at a peak, and that subsequent asset write downs after fundraising suggest that NAVs are inflated by some GPs during fundraising.
Taken together, these studies tend to focus on the shorter-term behavior of IRRs, particularly around fundraising. In contrast, we examine the longer-term behavior of NAVs in terms of their relation to actual subsequent cash flows over the life of the fund. If the biases in valuations documented in prior research relating to the incentive for GPs to show high fund performance during fundraising are prevalent (the "fundraising" incentive), then the relation between NAVs and cash flows should show a discernable pattern during fund life. In addition, we also consider whether fund valuations exhibit biases in later years because GPs have incentives to keep NAVs high towards the end of the life of funds, especially for GPs who have performed poorly and so may be boosting NAVs to reap greater management fees (the "milking" incentive).
Our study also relates to the vast literature examining properties of fair value accounting estimates (see Landsman (2007) for a summary of the literature A key limitation of such studies is that there generally is no direct independent measure of economic value-i.e., future cash flows are unobservable-thus, researchers have to assume that investors' assessments of value are reliable proxies for economic value. A major advantage of our research setting examining valuations made by GPs of private equity funds is that the relatively short lives of such funds permits us to observe the actual cash flows associated with each fund throughout the life of the fund. This permits us to directly compare the economic value of the funds to the accounting estimates that GPs provide.
Predictions and Research Design
Primary Estimations
Our research objective is to determine how NAVs that GPs provide to their funds' limited partners compare to the subsequent net cash flows they will receive. The future cash flows can be both inflows, i.e., fund contributions, or outflows, i.e., distributions to fund investors. We set the discount rate equal to 11%, which is the average realized cash internal rate of return for funds in Jenkinson et al. (2013) . We then estimate the number of years since inception by dividing the difference by 365 and taking the integer as the value of the fund-year. Because sample sizes are small for n > 10 , we only tabulate findings relating to fund years between 0 and 10.
Untabulated statistics reveal NAV and DCF are highly skewed. Thus, we estimate regressions using their natural logs. The fund life regressions are given by equation (1):
Equation (1) permits us to assess whether there are any patterns in valuations throughout the average fund's life. The calendar year regressions are given by equation (2):
Equation (2) permits us to assess whether there are any intertemporal patterns in valuations that are evidence of learning or improvements in valuation techniques over time.
We estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for buyout funds and VC funds to allow for differences in risk characteristics of the types of funds as well as incentives of fund managers. 4 In the fund-year regressions, i.e., equation (1) (1) and (2), we constrain the intercept to be zero. We do so to ensure that the relation between the economic value of a fund, DCF, and the GP's accounting-based value, NAV, is reflected by the slope rather than the intercept and the slope. Untabulated findings from estimations that include an intercept result in significantly positive intercepts and significantly smaller slopes than those associated with estimation of equations (1) and (2), especially in the early lives of funds. Economic interpretations of DCF values based on the equations (1) and (2) and estimations that include intercepts are equivalent. The constrained regressions permit a more parsimonious and meaningful economic interpretation of how the slope coefficient varies with fund life or over calendar time. 5 Also, unlike many research settings, theoretically the intercept should be constrained to go through the origin because when NAV is equal to zero, DCF should be equal to zero.
If general partners report net asset values that are unbiased, i.e., approximate the economic values of their funds, and our assumed 11% discount rate is representative of the average fund, then we expect α 1n and α 1y to equal one. However, if their valuations under-(over-) state the economic value of their funds, then we expect α 1n and α 1y to be greater (less than) one. If the inferences based on Jenkinson et al. (2013) hold, on average, using our measure of economic value, then we expect to see α 1n exceed one in early fund years. This bias can stem from incentives for general partners to understate net asset values early in a fund's life so as to show high accounting-based internal rates of return during the marketing period for follow-on funds, which typically occur during years three through six in a current fund. The bias can also reflect the possibility that general partners simply set net asset values to contributed capital in a fund's early years before they learn whether the fund's investments will be successful. Because funds, on average, are successful, setting net asset values to contributed capital results in understated net asset values in a fund's early years. We examine the empirical validity of this source of bias below in section 4.
6 5 We are currently in the process of estimating versions of equations (1) and (2) that do not restrict intercepts to be zero. Such regressions have the benefit of permitting us to include year fixed effects when estimating equation (1) and fund-year fixed effects when estimating equation (2). Although estimating such regressions no longer permits us to benchmark the NAV slope coefficient against one, we still should be able to use them to assess relative differences in slope coefficients over fund life and calendar time. 6 To the extent that the true discount rate is greater than (less than) 11%, the appropriate benchmark prediction for ! !! and ! !! is no longer one. However, assuming expected discount rates are relatively stable over time and over a fund's life, then relative comparisons of coefficients at different points during the life of a fund are still appropriate. For example, if NAVs tend to be understated in the early years relative to the later years, then the early year coefficients will be higher than those in the later years.
Other things equal, we have no a priori predictions regarding potential bias in the calendar-year regression coefficients. However, if there is a bias during early sample years, then it is likely that the bias will dissipate over time as general partners learn. In other words, α 1y should converge to one (or some constant if the true expected discount rate differs from 11%) sometime during our sample period. Even if there is no bias, valuations might improve over time if valuation techniques improved, perhaps reflecting the influence of changes in accounting standards relating to fair value accounting. 
Estimations Relating to Managerial Incentives
We assess more directly whether there is evidence of incentive effects by estimating versions of equation (1), permitting the NAV coefficient to vary in particular years depending on whether a firm has achieved a benchmark level of performance. First, to assess whether there is an incentive for GPs of relatively unsuccessful funds to overstate NAVs relative to GPs of successful funds during the fundraising period, we distinguish funds that achieve a todate (meaning from the beginning of the fund's life to the current valuation date) 8% internal rate of return -the typical hurdle rate for being eligible for carried interest -and have received at least 70 percent of committed capital during years two through six from those that do not. We then estimate fund-year regressions permitting the NAV coefficient to differ during years three through six. We apply the 70 percent criterion to ensure that a sufficient amount of investment has already taken place so that the GP can be reasonably confident that the fund is, in fact, successful so that he can divert his attention to raising money for a follow-on fund. 8 We therefore estimate equation (3) 
Based on the prediction that funds that fail to meet the carried interest and committed capital thresholds by the fundraising period, we expect a 2n to be positive. That is, the total NAV coefficient for successful funds, a 1n + a 2n , will be higher than that for less successful funds, a 1n . If there is a general tendency for GPs of both successful and unsuccessful funds to overstate NAVs, then a 1n + a 2n and a 1n will both be less than one.
Second, to assess whether there is an incentive for GPs of relatively unsuccessful funds to overstate NAVs relative to GPs of successful funds during the later fund years, we distinguish funds that achieve an 8% internal rate of return from those that have not. We then estimate fund-year regressions permitting the NAV coefficient to differ during years seven through ten. The estimating equation (4) includes the interaction of an indicator variable, D_MILK and NAV, where D_MILK equals one if a fund has failed to meet the 8% carried interest threshold.
Based on the prediction that GPs of less successful funds have a greater incentive to "milk the management fees" than managers of successful funds, then we expect a 2n to be negative. If 8 Figure 2 , Panel B, plots the median percentage of total contributions received by fund year. The median fund reaches the 100 percent contribution threshold somewhere between years four and five. The 70 percent threshold is reached somewhere between years two and three providing assurance that it is a reasonable criterion to establish whether a fund is at or near a fundraising period.
there is general tendency for GPs to milk the management fees, then a 1n + a 2n and a 1n will both be less than one. As with equations (1) and (2), we estimate equations (3) and (4) separately for Buyout and VC funds. 
Data and Sample
We obtain all data for estimation of equations (1) and (2) from Burgiss, which, according to their website, provides portfolio management software and data and analytics to asset owners investing in private equity capital. 10 Recently, Burgiss has begun to make available archival data to academic researchers. Because of confidentiality agreements between Burgiss and its customers, we and other academic researchers are unable to access the data directly. As a result, we indicate to Burgiss the data items we wish to access and they provide programming assistance that enables us to compute sample summary statistics and to conduct regression analyses. This protocol involves our submitting programs to them and their providing output and a log of each program's execution.
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As noted in Harris et al. (2014) , " [a] ccording to Burgiss, the dataset 'is sourced exclusively from LPs [i.e., the primary investors] and includes their complete transactional and valuation history between themselves and their primary fund investments.' " We 9 One concern with our partitioning on performance to assess whether there are systematic differences in NAV coefficients that we would like to attribute to differences in managerial incentives is that such differences could arise mechanically. In particular, funds that fall below (exceed) an 8% threshold as of any valuation date are more likely to fall below (exceed) the 11% expected discount rate we impose on the discounted cash flows. In the regression framework we use, this means the NAV coefficient for relatively poor performing funds will likely be less than that for funds that have met the 8% IRR threshold. There is no easy solution to this mechanically induced spread between the NAV coefficients for relatively high and low performing funds. However, because we can think of no a priori reason why this mechanical effect should change over fund life, we are in the process of re-estimating equations (3) and (4) partitioning funds based on the realized IRR, i.e., ultimate actual fund performance, to determine if the coefficient spreads are larger during the fundraising and milking periods relative to other fund years, when GPs of relatively poor performing funds have an incentive to overstate NAVs. 10 See Harris et al. (2014) for a description of the Burgiss database. 11 We reviewed each log file together with the related output to assess whether the output and program appeared to be internally consistent. For example, when imposing particular data screens, we examined output with and without the screens and the log files to determine that the screens were properly implemented. use the cash flow data necessary to compute discounted cash flows through 2011. 12 We also exclude NAVs beyond year ten of the fund life to minimize the impact of inactive funds on reported NAVs (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009 ).
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We delete outlier observations based on the ratio of discounted cash flow to net asset value, i.e., DCF / NAV . In particular, using the full sample, we exclude those observations that are in the top or bottom 2.5%. This ensures that we have net asset values that appropriately correspond to the remaining cash flows. For example, some general partners update the net asset values in anticipation of the final cash distribution, which yields an extreme value of DCF / NAV . Our trimming procedure effectively eliminates such observations that tend to occur at the beginning or end of a fund's life. 12 The version of the Burgiss dataset we accessed extends through June 2013. Because Burgiss does not indicate when a fund closes, we impose the restriction that there are no distributions between December 2011 and June 2013 for a fund to be included in our sample. In addition, although there are some funds with net asset values beyond 2007 that also end by 2011, there are not enough of them to make reliable inferences. 13 We also eliminate observations for which NAV is zero within two years of the end of the fund and a handful of observations with negative NAVs or negative DCFs.
construction, the number of observations trails off beginning in 2003 because of our requirement that all sample funds must have cash distributions that end in 2011. Table 2 presents mean, median, and standard deviations for the ratio of discounted cash flow to net asset value, DCF / NAV , separately for buyout funds and venture capital funds. Panel A (B) presents statistics by fund year (calendar year). Because the ratio can be dominated by extreme values, we limit our discussion here to medians. in 1994, but is never less than 1.14 before 1998, and reaches a minimum of 0.74 in 2000 but is never higher than 1.10 after 1997. However, the medians for the two types of funds display some differences. In particular, although both types of funds seemed to be affected by the bursting of the tech bubble in 1999-2000, the median DCF / NAV for VC funds was more greatly affected, falling nearly 50 percent to 0.57 in 2000, and it never recovered back to 1.00.
In contrast, median DCF / NAV for Buyout funds is at least 1.00 from 2002 to 2004. 15 Figure 2 , Panel A, plots the median ratio of cumulative contributions to NAV by fund year, which indicate that the median is essentially one for both buyout and venture capital funds through year 3. This is consistent with the second reason for the apparent conservative bias in a fund's early years, but it does not rule out the incentivebased reason. Table 3 , panels A and B, presents regression summary statistics relating to estimation of equations (1) and (2), which relate to fund life and calendar year. We present separate findings for Buyout funds and VC funds. Figure 3 , panels A and B, plot the corresponding fund life and calendar year coefficients, and . Untabulated findings reveal all and coefficients are significantly greater than zero. However, because our focus is on the extent to which α 1n and α 1y differ from one, we tabulate t-statistics corresponding to tests for differences from one rather than zero.
Results
Primary Estimations
16
The findings in Table 3 , panel A, indicate that for both types of funds, with the exception of years 0 and 1 (and year 2 for VC funds), all coefficients are insignificantly different from one. These findings provide statistical support for the inference we draw from the median plots in Figure 1 and the coefficient plots in Figure 3 , panel A, that fund managers, on average, do a remarkably good job on average in estimating the economic value of their funds, particularly after the first few fund years. Finding the coefficients are significantly greater than one in years 0 and 1, as well as for year 2 for VC funds, is consistent with fund managers conservatively setting NAVs to contributed capital in the early years until GPs can determine the actual value of the investments. The plots in Figure 2 of cumulative contributions to NAVs are consistent with this explanation. In particular, for the first several years of the fund, contributions are effectively equal to NAVs, i.e., the ratio is very close to 16 Significance levels for α 1 coefficients are based on a two-sided alternative. We refer to a coefficient as being significantly different from one (marginally significant) if it meets the 0.05 (0.10) significance level.
one. Later in the fund life, contributions exceed NAVs as GPs make distributions to LPs as they begin the process of winding down the fund.
The findings in Table 3, This could also reflect their inability to incorporate the effects of the financial crisis on future cash flows when reporting NAVs in the years preceding the crisis.
The findings in table 3 suggest the possibility that fund life coefficients could be higher in the years preceding the bursting of the tech bubble. To assess whether this is the case, we re-estimate equation (1) for buyout and venture capital funds, partitioning the sample into two subperiods. The first (second) includes observations whose NAVs are between 1988 NAVs are between and 1997 NAVs are between (1998 NAVs are between and 2007 . Table 4 , panels A and B, presents regression summary statistics corresponding to the earlier and later time periods. The findings in panel A indicate that as with the full sample findings in Table 3 , panel A, fund year coefficients, , in the first few years are the largest in magnitude and are significantly greater than one. However, in contrast to the full sample, the coefficients in the remaining fund years are generally significantly subperiod. It is difficult to determine from the data whether this is a purposeful manipulation of NAVs or simply the general inability to anticipate economic shocks. However, even if the latter explanation is true, we expect that NAVs should at some point reflect updated expectations of future cash flows and thus should not exhibit systematic overvaluations like that observed in Table 4 , Panel B. Collectively, the findings in tables 3 and 4 indicate that combining all sample years-as is done in table 3, panel A, masks significant differences over the full sample period that are apparent from the table 4 findings.
Effects of Managerial Incentives
We extend the previous analyses that focus on the general accuracy of GPs in reporting NAVs by examining specific periods in which incentives may be higher to manipulate reported NAVs. As previously noted, the prior literature has findings that are consistent with GPs increasing NAVs during periods in which they are attempting to raise money for new follow on funds in order to show better performance (Brown et al. 2013; Jenkinson et al. 2014, Barber and Yasuda, 2014) . where fundraising is most likely to occur. In contrast, in three of the four fund-years, years four through six, the NAV coefficient for VC funds is significantly larger for relatively high performing funds, i.e., those for which D_70_8 is one. In fact, for these three fund-years, whereas each of the NAV coefficients for relatively low performing funds are less than one, 0.995, 0.993, and 0.996, those for relatively high performing funds are greater than one, 1.012, 1.017, and 1.013. Taken together, these findings are consistent with our prediction that GPs of relatively poor performing VC funds having an incentive to overstate NAVs during the fundraising period. One possible explanation for there being a difference in coefficients only for VC funds is that VC funds are inherently more difficult to value and therefore afford their GPs greater discretion in reporting NAVs to limited partners. 
Fund Raising Period
Late Fund Life Management Fees
Summary and Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this study is to determine how NAVs that GPs of private equity funds provide to their funds' LPs compare to the subsequent net cash flows the LPs will receive. To address our research question, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of DCFs, which we take as an estimate of true economic value on NAVs at each date for which NAVs are provided. Our sample, which comprises NAV and cash flow information taken from the 
